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SECURITIES TRADING:
A CONTRACTUAL PERSPECTIVE
Jonathan R. Maceyt
INTRODUCTION
When Henry Manne wrote his famous article, In Defense of In-
sider Trading,' following his classic book Insider Trading and the
Stock Market,2 insider trading was viewed as an immoral, unscrupu-
lous, unfair, and vicious attack on the market and investors. The
same, of course, is true today.
The development of the justifications for outlawing insider trad-
ing date back at least to a 1910 article written by legal scholar H.L.
Wilgus. 3 Drawing on lawyerly appeals to the ideals of fairness and
morality, Wilgus concluded that the practice of insider trading was
morally offensive.4 Other legal scholars, namely Professor A.A.
Berle, agreed with Wilgus and continued scholarly work supporting
Wilgus' initial desire to outlaw insider trading.5
These views were reflected during those portions of the Con-
gressional hearings on the promulgation of the Securities Laws that
were held in 1933 and 1934 to discuss the practice and impact of in-
sider trading. As Dean Manne observed, these hearings resulted in
the practical adoption of many of the ideas of Wilgus and Berle with-
out any concrete explanation for their blanket acceptance. 6 In par-
ticular, Sections 10(b)7 and 16(b) 8 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 9 were enacted to prevent insiders from trading
on their superior knowledge of corporate affairs.
t J. DuPratt White Professor of Law and Director, John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Cornell University Law School.
1 Henry G. Manne, In Defense ofInsider Trading, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at
113.
2 See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
3 For further discussion, see H.L. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Di-
rectorfrom a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1910).
4 See MANNE, supra note 2, at 4.
5 See id. at 5.
6 See id. at 10-11.
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
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The rules prohibiting insider trading are justified on the grounds
that insider trading represents the abuse of information that was in-
tended exclusively for corporate purposes. The rules also are de-
fended on the grounds that it is inherently unfair for insiders to trade
on the basis of information that is unavailable to those with whom the
insider is dealing. Section 16b applies to statutorily defined insiders
(officer, director, or 10% shareholder) and forbids them from having
a purchase followed by a sale (or vice versa) within a six-month pe-
riod.1° Like Rule lOb-5, Section 16b, though applied in different
situations, was predicated and defended on the basis of the notion of
immoral unfairness stated first by Wilgus and further supported by
Berle.
The purpose of this essay is to make a simple point that has been
largely ignored in the literature. My point is that the academic debate
surrounding insider trading in general, and the reaction to Professor
Manne's work in particular, tells us as much about the culture of aca-
demia as it does about the law, economics, and policy of insider
trading.
While dozens of legal scholars have entered the halls of debate
to present their views of the subject, none has done so with the cour-
age of Henry Manne. Sometimes I ask myself whether I would have
the courage to write something as controversial and contrary to ac-
cepted academic doctrine as Manne's classic 1966 work Insider
Trading and the Stock Market. This seminal work challenged the
ideas of Wilgus, Berle and the holdings of Congress, and led to Dean
Manne's ostracism, at least for a time, from polite academic circles in
law.
Two things about Dean Manne's work-and the visceral reaction
to it by legal academics-are instructive. First, regardless of whether
one agrees or disagrees with Dean Manne's outlook, Manne was the
first person to attempt to analyze the phenomenon of insider trading
from a serious interdisciplinary perspective. In rejecting the 'it's just
not right' reasoning and offering his own theory to analyze insider
trading, Professor Manne did not merely improve the quality of the
intellectual discourse concerning insider trading; he revolutionized it.
Manne's thorough analysis and comprehensive conclusions pro-
vide a reasonable and practical explanation for why non-government-
regulated insider trading might be considered not only a feasible, but
also a desirable part of the compensation scheme of a rational pub-
licly held corporation. But Manne's historical achievement in writing
about insider trading is reflected at least as much in the approach he
'o See 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
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takes in this work as in the conclusions he reaches. By taking an
analytical welfare-economics approach to this subject, Dean Manne
single-handedly raised the quality of the discourse in this area and
began the transformation of legal academia, from sleepy backwater to
its current position at the center of the intellectual life of the modem
university.
Perhaps even more important than the nature of Dean Manne's
discourse about insider trading was the sheer moral courage Manne
displayed. Legal academia is a club, and to be ostracized by its elite
can curtail or ruin a young academic's career, even a career with
Manne's stellar credentials. I wonder how many people in academics
today would have the courage to risk everything to write what they
want to write, to reach the conclusions they think are justified, and
then to stand by those conclusions in the midst of the unprecedented
criticism that Dean Manne initially received for his work. I am sure
that the number is not very large. For this alone, Dean Manne de-
serves recognition.
Part I of this paper considers Professor Manne's ideas about in-
sider trading and explores how those ideas can be practically applied.
Part II focuses on some insider trading cases and discusses the rela-
tionship between the law and Manne's ideas.
I. HENRY MANNE'S CONTRIUTIONS TO INSIDER TRADING
SCHOLARSHIP
Rejecting scholarship that substituted platitudes for analysis, one
of the principal insights of Manne's analysis is that in order to ana-
lyze insider trading properly, one must identify who is harmed by
trading on the basis of non-public information.11 Professor Manne
reached the conclusion-which remains highly controversial today-
that it is difficult and often impossible to identify shareholders dam-
aged by a system that permits insiders to trade on non-public infor-
mation. To explain his point, Manne drew an analogy between the
operation of the securities markets and the Brownian effect in physi-
cal science.
In physics, the Brownian effect illustrates how gas molecules
will perform under pressure as they interact with one another. Ac-
cording to the theory, when gas molecules collide with each other,
they create a completely random pattern. Similarly, according to
1 See MANNE, supra note 2, at 93. This argument is especially pertinent to long term-
investors. Because a long-term investor will be less likely to sell based on a price fluctuation,
insider activities will have little affect on the investment choices of such an investor. Manne
also asserts that short-term investors will also benefit from the activities of insiders. Id.
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Manne, in a market that is denied the additional information that an
insider possesses, stock prices will be randomly decided and fail to
reflect any prior transaction prices. 12 Without the presence of addi-
tional information that only an insider can provide, investors will ran-
domly gamble on particular stocks, thus creating a pattern of arbitrary
stock pricing.13
Stock market prices can become less "random" only through an
increase in knowledge. 14 Such an increase in knowledge will result
from allowing insiders, who possess superior knowledge, to enter the
trading arena and participate. Through their participation in trading,
insiders' informational advantage will be passed on to outsiders, and
share prices will become more accurate barometers of a firm's true
net value.
Conversely, one can argue, as the Security and Exchange Com-
mission (hereinafter "SEC") has done, and continues to do, that an
outsider would not sell his shares to an insider if the outsider pos-
sessed the same level of knowledge as the insider. 15 Professor Manne
countered this argument with an observation about causation. He
pointed out that one would need to know whether an outsider would
have behaved differently if insiders were not allowed to trade before
the information was disclosed. Barring any empirical evidence to
support the SEC's arguments, Manne argued that its conclusions were
premature.
Manne observes that, "[olbviously every shareholder would like
to have access to more valuable information, just as he would like to
have access to more wealth. But there is no reason to believe that the
rule about insider trading will have any effect on the time of his
sale .... , 16 In other words, in the absence of evidence to show that
an outsider would behave differently prior to the disclosure of inside
information, it is by no means clear that the insider's trading harmed
his counter-parties. Indeed, it may actually have helped them. In
subsequent work, David Haddock and I applied Dean Manne's work
through the use of the accompanying graphical illustrations. 17 The
basic point builds on the intuition that when informed traders pur-
12 See id. at 97.
13 See id.
14 See id. (arguing that the best way to combat the problem of inaccurately valued stocks
is through increased information flow).
15 See William H. Painter, Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 35 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 146, 147-48 (1966).
16 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J.
933, 934 (Winter 1985) [hereinafter Property Rights].
17 David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model ofInsider Trading, 80 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1449 (1986).
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chase stock, they tend to drive up the price (as illustrated in Figure 5-
1), and when informed traders sell stock they tend to drive down the
price of the stock (as illustrated in Figure 5-2). 18 As such, if an unin-
formed outside investor buys stock when an insider is selling, his pur-
chase is likely to be at a lower price then it would have been in the
absence of the insider's sales. Likewise, if an uninformed outside
investor sells stock when an insider is buying, that sale is likely to be
at a higher price than it would have been in the absence of the in-
sider's trading activity.
Thus, when investors are so-called "time-function traders"-that
is, when they simply are basing their decisions about when to buy and
sell stock on their own internal patterns of consumption and invest-
ment over their life cycle-Dean Manne argued that insider trading
provided benefits rather than imposed costs. In other words, as long
as the insider trading did not cause the trading by the outsider-that
is, as long as the outsider would have traded anyway-then insider
trading may be seen as beneficial, at least to the shareholders who are
selling while the insiders are buying and those buying while the insid-
ers are selling.
Where outsiders believe there is the potential for negative effects
from insider trading, outside investors may limit the negative impact
by anticipating which particular stocks have the highest potential to
be negatively affected by inside traders. Outsiders would naturally
shy away from such stocks. There are indications that outsiders do, in
fact, discount such stocks.19 This behavior by outsiders indicates that
a defense mechanism to potentially negative insider trading is cur-
rently in place.
Of course, any outsider would, at zero cost, want to know more
about his specific stocks and their intrinsic value. However, regard-
less of whether insider trading is allowed, the outsider will never be
privy to all of the possible information that exists concerning his spe-
cific shares and a specific corporation. Allowing insider trading will
likely benefit the insider, but the true outsider is no worse off than he
was when insider trading was restricted.
In addition to the above-mentioned "time-function trader,"
whose trading is timed on the basis of his desire to save and his need
to consume over the course of his life-cycle, there is another class of
trader: the "price-function trader." Changing patterns of consumption
and investment over the life cycle of the trader and his family does
8 S e e i d a t 1 4 6 9 .
19 See Harold Demsetz, The Market for Corporate Control: Corporate Control, Insider
Trading and Rates of Return, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 313, 316 (1986) (analyzing the effects of
insider trading on controlling shareholders).
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not motivate the trading patterns of price-function traders. Rather,
these traders are harmed by insider trading because the trading of in-
siders induces their trading.
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose that the share
price of Symbonics stock is $50.00 per share. Suppose that a profes-
sional stock trader has analyzed the firm carefully and has reached the
conclusion that this is the "appropriate" price for the firm's stock
from a financial perspective. This professional investor is of the view
that the properly discounted present value of the future income to
shareholders (which comes in the form of dividends, capital gains,
and/or liquidating dividends generated by the firm for its sharehold-
ers) justifies the current share price of $50.00 per share, but no more.
Suppose further, however, that an insider is in possession of
material, non-public negative information about the company. For
example, imagine that the company's chief financial officer knows
that the company's earnings for the next quarter will be substantially
lower than the consensus forecast of the Wall Street analysts who
follow the stock. As in the previous example of trading by the time-
function trader, insider trading by this corporate officer-in this case,
selling-is likely to drive down the value of the company's stock.
Unlike the effect on the time-function trader in the above exam-
ple, trading by the insider is likely to harm the price-function trader.
These price-function traders, unlike time-function traders, are market
professionals who have views about the intrinsic value of the shares
they are trading and are induced by the insider's trading to buy.
Turning back to the above example, if the insider's selling on the ba-
sis of his information about earnings drives down the value of the
firm's shares, say, to $48.00 per share, the professional time-function
trader is likely to decide to buy the stock. After all, his analysis leads
him to the conclusion that the stock is really worth $50.00 per share.
Thus, the time-function trader's view is that risk-based arbitrage
profits of $2.00 per share are available to traders who purchase at
$48.00, because the stock really is worth $50.00 per share.
Insider trading activity induces time-function traders to trade,
whereas it does not have the same effect on price-function traders. As
such, while time-function traders benefit from insider trading on the
basis of material non-public information, such trading harms price-
function traders.
Thus, one important implication of Dean Manne's scholarship on
insider trading is that much of the debate about insider trading in-
volves issues of allocation. In other words, from a practical perspec-
tive, at least some of what is at stake in the debate about insider trad-
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ing is how the gains and losses from trading should be allocated
within the galaxy of investors and potential investors that constitutes
a corporation's investment community. In a nutshell, insider trading
harms price-function traders, while time-function traders may benefit
from such trading. Of course, whenever there are both gains and
losses from a particular activity within a community, the Coase Theo-
rem suggests that unless transaction costs present insurmountable ob-
stacles, or unless there are effects on third parties, externalities, that
are not reflected in bilateral contracts, private contracting will lead to
outcomes that are efficient and socially desirable.
Thus, Dean Manne's cogent analysis remains, as Dennis Carlton
and Daniel Fischel have observed, truly "[t]he starting point for any-
one interested in the subject" of insider trading.20 Manne's work fo-
cused attention first on issues of efficiency and later on issues of in-
tra-firm contracting and politics. These issues remain intensely inter-
esting to scholars. However, the core implication of Dean Manne's
work is that the intellectual foundation of the regulations and policies
that govern insider trading should be grounded in contractual theories,
not generalized notions of "fairness" or tort. It is this intuition that
drove Dean Manne to his now famous idea that insider trading might
represent an efficient way to compensate managers.
A. Insider Trading and Market Efficiency
Dean Manne argued that trading by insiders would cause the
stock market to function more efficiently. 21 To understand this argu-
ment, one must first understand the concept of efficiency as it is ap-
plied in the context of capital markets because the concept is used
somewhat differently than it is in microeconomics generally.
The concept of stock market efficiency is comprised of two
components: speed and accuracy. The first component involves the
speed at which information about a security gets to the market and
comes to be reflected in stock prices. The more efficiently informa-
tion about a security is reflected in price, the more efficient the mar-
ket for that security is thought to be.
Second, efficiency is concerned with how accurately information
is reflected in the market price of a security.22 Economists generally
20 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L REv. 857, 857 n.1 (1983).
21 See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547,
565 (1970) [hereinafter Law Professors] (providing a defense after his previous work, Insider
Trading and the Stock Market received much criticism).
22 See George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclo-
sure Requirments, in ECONOIc POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SEcuRITIEs 23,
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agree that insider trading will generally lead to more accurate stock
prices, since insider trading will increase the amount of available, real
information concerning a specific firm. 23 Simply put, insiders do not
trade on the basis of non-public information unless current prices are
inaccurate. Insiders will sell if and only if current prices are too high.
Insiders will buy if and only if current prices are too low.
At the same time, however, it is far from clear how quickly in-
formation becomes public with or without insider trading, although it
is clear that market prices are more accurate once the information is
released. Dean Manne observed that insider trading might effectively
accomplish the goal of having a more efficient stock market by caus-
ing insiders' knowledge about the value of firm shares to become re-
flected in the market more quickly than they otherwise would.
Absent insider trading, companies choose to disclose certain
pertinent information concerning the company for a number of rea-
sons.24 In particular, firms may choose to disclose information about
themselves to attract outside investment; to permit current investors to
sell their shares to outsiders at the appropriate price; to gauge the suc-
cess or lack thereof of their corporate managers thereby encouraging
or discouraging corporate control transactions; or to comply with
contractual obligations to investors.25 Dean Manne argued that there
are times when insider trading would be the most effective and ap-
propriate means of communicating certain information to the market.
For example, disclosure by some firms, particularly of good news,
may simply not be credible to outside investors in companies where
management lacks a proven track-record of reliability unless such
disclosure is made credible by insider purchases. In other words, in-
sider purchases operate as a sort of bond, rendering credible the as-
sertions by managers that the firm is performing above the expecta-
tions of investors.
Insider trading also could allow a firm to release information
through trading that it would not release through a public announce-
ment. For example, when announcing certain information publicly
could destroy the value of the information by providing information
to competitors, or depriving the firn of the ability to exploit the value
of the information, Dean Manne would permit insiders to trade.26 At
26 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969) (studying the effects of accounting disclosure requirements on
corporations and investors).
23 See Property Rights, supra note 16, at 935 (discussing economic issues of insider trad-
ing) (citation omitted).
24 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 20, at 867.
25 See i.
26 Seeid. at868.
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the same time, if a firm does not want to release all of its available
information at a particular time, it can control the release of informa-
tion by self-regulating the trading of its insiders.27 Implicit in this
analysis is the assumption that inside information is a valuable prop-
erty right that rightfully belongs to the corporation to which it per-
tains. The corporation should have the right to authorize or to pro-
hibit trading by insiders and other fiduciaries. Insider trading enables
a firm to control how much information it is willing to release into the
market depending on the time-specific needs of the firm, and permits
such information to be released in a credible manner.
Dean Manne's analysis also lead him to the conclusion that in-
sider trading accomplishes another important goal related to effi-
ciency. Because information is costly to locate and verify, it may not
be cost-effective for analysts and other market professionals to seek
out and verify information that is not clearly valuable. In other
words, securities prices may not fully reflect small pieces of informa-
tion. According to Dean Manne, however, permitting insider trading
allows market prices to reflect small inputs of information more
quickly and accurately than they would in the absence of such trad-
ing.28 These small pieces of information may have a cumulative im-
portance that is out of proportion to their individual, piecemeal value.
This is likely true because if the market price reflects all of the little
pieces of information affecting returns to shareholders, then overall
stock prices will be more accurate.
Therefore, Dean Manne's analysis led him to the conclusion that
insider trading can contribute to market predictability and stability.
One aspect of this intuition is relatively straightforward: as the effi-
ciency of the stock market increases, everyone is better off. In a per-
fectly efficient market, capital would be allocated to those firms that
could best use it.29 This, in turn, would mean that resources in the
economy would be utilized as effectively as possible to promote em-
ployment and the appropriate utilization of scarce commodities.30
In fact, however, the actual effects of insider trading on market
efficiency are by no means clear. It is not ambiguously true that in-
sider trading results in information becoming reflected in firm share
prices more quickly. Whether insider trading will improve stock
market efficiency is an empirical question about which we lack in-
2 See id.
28 See Lmv Professors, supra note 21, at 574 (arguing that the dissemination of informa-
tion through insider trading provides a more efficient mechanism for stock valuation).
" For further historical discussion of this concept, see ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, TiH MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 280 (1932).
0 See Carlton & ischel, supra note 20, at 867.
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formation. One possibility that Dean Manne did not take into consid-
eration is the possibility that insiders may, under certain circum-
stances, actually delay the release of important information. This
would allow insiders to gain the time necessary to implement a trad-
ing strategy permitting them to extract the maximum gain from the
use of the information. For example, it might be best, from the point
of view of an insider with non-public positive information, to make a
series of small purchases of stock (or derivatives) over a relatively
protracted period of time in order to minimize the price impact of
such purchases. This tactic allows insiders to minimize their acqui-
sition costs by reducing the price impact of their purchases. By
stringing out their purchases or sales over a longer period of time,
insiders could minimize the effects of their purchases on average
trading volume in order to impede the ability of market professionals
to "decode" the information being conveyed by the insiders' trading.
Another effect that must be taken into account when gauging the
effects of insider trading on market efficiency is its effect on transac-
tion costs that such trading imposes on market participants. As David
Haddock and I observed in earlier work, all traders bear a share of the
increased costs to market makers that are associated with insider
trading.31 The logic behind this observation is simple. The bid-asked
spread, quoted by exchange specialists and other market makers, rep-
resents a transaction cost for market participants. In turn, from the
perspective of the market makers, this bid-asked spread represents the
risks, as well as the carrying costs and other expenses associated with
holding an inventory of securities and maintaining a continuous two-
sided market. Increases in the incidence of insider trading cause, in
turn, an increase in the expected losses that market makers experience
as a result of maintaining an inventory and making a two-sided mar-
ket in a firm's stock. This is because market professionals systemati-
cally profit-by difference, or "spread" between the bid price and the
offered price-in trades to outsiders. However, because insiders will
never buy on the basis of inside information unless the offered price
is too low, and because they will never sell unless the bid price is too
high, market makers and other market professionals, such as ex-
change specialists, will systematically lose in their trading interac-
tions with insiders.
Consequently, holding all else equal, as the percentage of insid-
ers among the entire population of traders in the shares of a particular
firm goes up, expected losses to market-makers and other liquidity
31 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Inter-
est Model, With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 331 (1987)
(using a private interest model to examine regulations promulgated and enforced by the SEc).
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providers will concomitantly increase. In order to compensate them-
selves for these expected losses to insiders, providers of liquidity
must increase their bid-asked spread.32
The above analysis reveals two vitally important contributions
provided by Dean Manne's work on insider trading. The first is that
the direct costs of insider trading are borne in the first instance by
market professionals, particularly specialists and market makers.
Analysts, arbitrageurs, and others who attempt to profit by being the
first to trade on the basis of public information are harmed by insider
trading because they are induced to trade at the wrong prices. Mar-
ket-makers systematically lose in their trading interactions with insid-
ers because they trade at the wrong prices-although these losses are
passed on to the trading population generally in the form of higher
trading costs, particularly larger bid-asked spreads.
Second, these costs are internalized within the firm whose shares
are being traded. Because the costs and benefits of insider trading are
internalized, the solution to the policy question of whether insider
trading should be permitted must be contractual in nature. This, in
turn, leads to the question of how the rights to trade on the basis of
material non-public information should be allocated within a firm.
This question, as Dean Manne first pointed out, boils down to an in-
quiry about executive compensation and whether the right to trade on
inside information might comprise an element of an efficient execu-
tive compensation package. It is to this issue that we now turn.
B. Insider Trading and Compensation for the Entrepreneurial
Executive
In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter wrote that large corporations were
ineffective at providing compensation for entrepreneurs working for
the corporation.33  Building on this premise, Manne vigorously as-
n Several empirical studies report that higher incidences of insider trading lead to in-
creases in bid-asked spreads. See, e.g., Waiter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, FIN.
ANALYSTS J. Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 12 (arguing that confusion between market gains and trading
gains caused people to continue to play the market game, although their trading performance
rarely departed from neutral); George J. Benston & Robert L. Hagerman, Determinants of Bid-
Asked Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market, I J. FIN. ECON. 353 (1974); Thomas E. Cope-
land & Dan Gala, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983) (modeling
the dealer's bid-ask spread as a tradeoff between expected losses to informed traders and ex-
pected gains from liquidity traders); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading and
Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189 (1986) (examining the relation between the bid-ask
spread and insiders' abnormal profits).
3 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrrALISM, SOCIALIsM, AND DEMOCRACY 134 (1942)
(analyzing the effects and impact of political systems on capitalist markets).
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serted and defended the proposition that insider trading could solve
the problems of ineffectual or inadequate managerial compensation.34
Dean Manne argued in Inside Trading and the Stock Market that
corporate employee financial compensation opportunities are lim-
ited-for example, through bonuses or perhaps stock options. These
limitations handcuff firms regardless of the magnitude of the em-
ployee's idea or innovation or the size the marginal contribution of
the employee to the overall value of the enterprise. Dean Manne ob-
served that when managers are compensated with stock or with op-
tions, an employee's compensation is limited to the number of shares
or options granted.35 In a substantial number of cases, this compen-
sation falls short of the magnitude of the employee's contribution to
the corporation.
Dean Manne argued that allowing insider trading as a method of
entrepreneurial compensation availed intra-corporate entrepreneurs of
the opportunity to be fully compensated for the value of their mar-
ginal product to the firm. According to Manne, because corporate
employees are not entitled to "a direct proprietary interest in their
ideas," insider trading allows such entrepreneurs to be able to capi-
talize on their knowledge within the market.36
Additionally, Manne argued that while compensation in the form
of stock and options may be correlated with, and limited to, the
amount of money an entrepreneur currently holds and is able to in-
vest, trading profits on the basis of inside information will not be
similarly constrained. According to Dean Manne, insiders can dis-
close the information to a financial intermediary, lender, and thereby
obtain credit to exploit fully the benefit of some entrepreneurial dis-
covery.
37
The most common argument raised against a system of entrepre-
neurial compensation based on inside information is that it places av-
erage investors at a competitive disadvantage. 3s Dean Manne re-
sponded to this argument by noting that a typical entrepreneur in a
company is not on the same footing as a typical investor. The entre-
preneur, most likely, will not already hold an investment in the firm.
Only if she holds such an investment will she be starting on the same
34 See MANNE, supra note 2, at 138-141. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
309 (1981) (arguing that a rule allowing information to be used freely may maximize the wealth
of both the users and society).
35 See MANNE, supra note 2, at 138.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 139.
38 See id. at 140 (arguing that allowing insiders to trade on information gained as a result
of their insider status unfairly compromises other investors' ability to compete in the market).
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playing field as the typical investor. Although being on the same
playing field sounds just or reasonable, we return to a situation where
the entrepreneur is no longer compensated for her ideas and innova-
tions. From an egalitarian standpoint, why should an entrepreneurial
insider be forced to merely hold a common investment and receive
the same rate of return as other investors, when the entrepreneur is
directly contributing to the prosperity and success of the corporation
in general? Without allowing for insider trading to take place, the
entrepreneur "is thus forced to share with all other shareholders the
profit that otherwise he alone could have gained."39
It would seem to me that whatever the merits of Dean Manne's
arguments about executive compensation, outside investors also must
be compensated for the risks associated with making investments.
For example, suppose that the current price of a firm's stock is $9.00.
Suppose further that an entrepreneurial insider makes a discovery that
promises to add sufficient value to the company to cause the price of
the stock to rise from $9.00 per share to $12.00 per share. The ques-
tion is how these gains should be allocated between the insiders and
the outside shareholders. Dean Manne's intuition is that the insiders
should receive some of these gains. The question, of course, is how
much and how to engineer such compensation. Presumably, Dean
Manne did not believe that insiders should receive all of the gains,
because if they did, shareholders would have no incentives to invest
in the first place. Rather, the implication of Dean Manne's analysis is
that these gains should be shared, and that the precise contours of the
distribution should be a matter of contract.
Dean Manne's depiction of insider trading as a matter of intra-
firm contract remains a stunning intellectual achievement. This sim-
ple idea transformed the nature of the debate about insider trading.
As noted above, the problem posed by insider trading is the issue of
how the gains associated with the discovery of material, non-public
information ought to be divided within a firm, and whether it is possi-
ble to permit insiders to trade in a manner that can be made transpar-
ent to shareholders and directors who vote on executive compensation
issues. Seen from this perspective, however, the propriety of insider
trading becomes "simply" an applied executive compensation prob-
lem. But the question whether transparent, fair contracts condoning
insider trading can be crafted remains unanswered. The decision to
grant a corporate executive a seven-figure, end-of-year bonus is also
an executive compensation problem. From the perspective of the
" Id. at 141.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
firn, the issues involved in deciding what is best are not so radically
different.
At bottom, the problem with bonuses or stock option plans for
executives is how to allocate surplus cash flows within the firm. The
point here is not to minimize the severe conflict-of-interest problems
and agency cost problems associated with insider trading. Rather, the
point is to emphasize that with the exception of the problem of
monitoring insider behavior, these problems are no more severe with
insider trading than they are with other forms of aggressive executive
compensation.
In a follow-up article written in response to the numerous, uni-
formly negative reviews of his initial work, Manne noted that at the
outset of his investigation of insider trading he assumed that the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission was fully and
efficiently discharging its duties and enforcing the rules outlawing
direct insider trading.40 After publishing his initial work, however,
Dean Manne came to the view that the rules against insider trading
were being selectively enforced and that only a fraction of insider
trading was investigated and pursued.41 Professor Manne believed
that the SEC's limited dollars would be spent pursuing those who ei-
ther opposed and/or were disliked by the SEC.
As a result of this selective enforcement, Dean Manne expressed
the belief that a group of unregulated insiders would emerge. In a
prescient analysis that anticipated much later work in public choice,
including my own joint work with David Haddock, Dean Manne pre-
dicted that this lucky group would not only gain access to exorbitant
wealth, but also would gain strong influence over a regulatory agent
of the government.43
As the following sections illustrate, what has emerged in the
decades following Dean Manne's analysis is a state of the world re-
markably close to what he envisioned. The law has developed along
vaguely contractual lines. Today, the rules against insider trading
seem to do more to police internal employment relationships within
firms than to police against conduct that harms outside investors or
markets.
40 See Law Professors, supra note 21, at 562.
41 See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1
(1980) (arguing that the legal system has been ineffective in regulating insider trading); James
H. Lorie & Victor Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.L.
& ECON. 35, 37 (1968) (indicating that proper and prompt analysis of data on insider trading
can be profitable).
42 See Law Professors, supra note 21, at 554.
41 See id. at 555.
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II. THE COURTS AND INSIDER TRADING
The development of insider trading law got off to a slow start in
cases like SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.44 and its progeny. The facts
of the case are well known, I will only recount them here in brief.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ("TGS") was a mining company in fi-
nancial distress. On the verge of bankruptcy, TGS officials com-
menced a series of aerial geological surveys in Timmens, Ontario.
These surveys revealed large mineral deposits on land they did not
own. In order to exploit the value of its discovery, and perhaps even
to survive, it was crucial that TGS be able to secure the mineral
rights.
Subsequent to the initial discovery of the mineral deposits, a
number of individuals who can be classified as insiders bought both
TGS stock as well as call option contracts on the stock. The SEC
brought suit against a number of these traders. Relying on cases such
as In re Cady, Roberts & Co.45 and its progeny, the SEC took the
categorical position that insiders with access to information that is
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose-not for their
personal benefit-may not use this information to their own advan-
tage when dealing with the uninformed investing public. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals also took an extremely aggressive stance in
its opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur. The court was of the view that "all
members of the investing public should be subject to identical market
risks ... [and that] inequities based upon unequal access to knowl-
edge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of
life .. .. 46 One commentator not generally identified with the Law
& Economics school aptly described this approach to Rule lOb-5 as
the "utopian dream of information parity among investors. ''47
Finally, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, rather than simply denying insid-
ers the ability to trade, the court held that insiders may in fact trade,
as long as they disclose the information first. This has become known
as the "disclose or abstain" rule.48
One might ask how Dean Marine would deal with the legal is-
sues presented by the fact pattern in Texas Gulf Sulphur. First, it
seems clear that Marine would reject the generalized "fairness" ap-
proach in which the use by a trader of any informational advantage,
44 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
4- Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-6668,40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
46 401 F.2d at 852.
47 James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 631 (1986).
4s See 401 F.2d at 859 (prohibiting insiders to trade on information not yet disclosed to the
investing public).
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regardless of the source of such an informational advantage, would be
a violation of Rule lOb-5. 49 He presumably would also reject the dis-
close-or-abstain approach embraced in the Texas Gulf Sulphur opin-
ion.
It is easy to see why this is so. Implicit in Manne's view that the
potential financial benefits from trading on material non-public inside
information can be used as a valuable component of an executive
compensation package is the assumption that such information is in
the nature of a valuable property interest. Consequently, it seems
clear that Dean Manne would object to the disclose-or-abstain ap-
proach taken in Texas Gulf Sulphur because this approach assumes
that non-public information of the type at issue in that case belongs to
the general trading public rather than to the corporation to which it
pertains. In other words, if material non-public information really
belongs to the corporation, then it would not be proper to trade on that
information after first disclosing it. In this sense, Dean Manne's ap-
proach to insider trading regulation can be seen as even more strict
(or, at least different) than the approach taken by the SEC and early
court opinions.
Interestingly, however, it would seem that Dean Manne would
agree with the "corporate purpose" concept espoused by the court and
the SEC in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Consistent with the position taken by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in Texas Gulf Sulphur and
subsequent cases, Dean Manne would agree that material, non-public
information should be used only to serve a "corporate purpose."
Where Manne would part ways with the SEC, of course, is in
relation to the meaning of the term "corporate purpose." First, Dean
Manne's perspective clearly advocates that if information is to be
used for a "corporate purpose," then it should be the corporation and
not the courts, the SEC, or the plaintiffs' bar that decides how that
information should be used. And, if the information is available for a
corporate purpose, then it should be the proper subject of executive
compensation agreements, because compensation of executives is a
valid corporate purpose.
Dean Manne, however, clearly suggests that the executive com-
pensation arrangements within the firm inevitably would permit the
insiders of TGS to trade on the information concerning the mineral-
rich land. To Manne's way of thinking, these insiders provided the
company with a chance to rise out of their poor economic predica-
49 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 355 (1979) (concluding that the disclose-or-abstain
rule derives both justification and limitations from the policy of the legislation).
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ment and regain power in the mineral market. For these efforts, ac-
cording to Manne, the insiders should be allowed to trade as a reward
for these entrepreneurial achievements. As noted above, however, the
benefits of such trading that Dean Manne identifies must be weighed
against the costs, which come in the form of higher transaction costs
for traders and reduced incentives for initial investment.
Texas Gulf Sulphur's intellectually empty fairness approach de-
scribed above provided the intellectual underpinnings for the rules
against insider trading until 1980. In that year, the entire regulatory
paradigm for Rule lOb-5 and insider trading was shifted by the land-
mark Supreme Court opinion in Chiarella v. United States.50 Chi-
arella adopted an entirely new or, at the very least, an entirely more
lucid legal interpretation to govern insider-trading cases brought un-
der section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934.
In Chiarella, the Court had to decide whether a non-insider who
learns about a future business transaction violates section 10(b) when
she trades on the information and does not disclose.5
Vincent Chiarella was employed by Pandick Press, a financial
printing company. Chiarella handled the printing of documents con-
cerning certain business takeovers. The identities of the purchaser
and target were concealed when Chiarella received material for proc-
essing. The names of these entities were added when the final copies
of the documents were printed. Chiarella was able to deduce the
names of the target companies.52 After doing so, the petitioner traded
on the information, despite the fact that not trading was clearly a con-
dition of his employment contract with his employer, and despite the
fact that Chiarella must have known that his employer's printing
services had been retained on the condition that they respect the con-
fidentiality of the information that had come to them in the course of
their work.
53
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that an individual
must have a pre-existing affirmative fiduciary duty in order to be li-
able for violating section 10(b)(5): "We hold that a duty to disclose
under §10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information."54
It is interesting to ponder how Dean Manne would have dealt
with Chiarella's conduct if he had been on the Supreme Court. I
think that Manne would embrace Justice Powell's observation that
'0 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
46 See id. at 222-23.
52 See id. at 223-25.
13 See id.
"' Id. at 235.
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mere possession of non-public information does not generate a duty
either to disclose such information or to refrain from trading on the
basis of that information. Moreover, I believe that Dean Manne
would take the position that the information belonged to the firm that
created it. Nevertheless, Dean Manne's idea that insider trading
should be used to compensate entrepreneurial managers could not be
used to justify Chiarella's activities. After all, Chiarella was not an
entrepreneur. Indeed, from Manne's perspective, Chiarella's trading
might be seen as harmful to the extent that it deprived an entrepreneu-
rial insider within the firm of the opportunity to profit on the basis of
the discovery that the target firm's shares were undervalued. Chi-
arella's trading also deprived the bidding firm's shareholders of the
ability to profit from this discovery.
Thus, like the SEC, Dean Manne would not have endorsed Vin-
cent Chiarella's behavior. But, unlike the SEC, and consistent with
the approach to Rule lOb-5 taken in Chiarella, Dean Manne would
not have endorsed the idea that Chiarella's conduct was wrongful be-
cause it violated some generalized duty to the marketplace. Rather,
like the majority opinion, Dean Manne's approach reflects the view
that some fiduciary relationship, like Chiarella's employment rela-
tionship with Pandick Press, is necessary to create a duty not to trade.
In response to the Court's decision, the SEC promulgated Rule
14e-3, which makes it illegal to purchase or sell, or to cause to be
purchased or sold, securities that are the subject of a tender offer
when a person is in possession of material information relating to
such tender offer if the person knows or has reason to know was ac-
quired from the tender offeror or the target.55 Rule 14e-3 was prom-
ulgated by the Commission to overrule Chiarella in the tender offer
context. Rule 14e-3 overrules Chiarella because Rule 14e-3 liability
arises when the person trading on non-public information in the ten-
der offer context is trading on the basis of material non-public infor-
mation, regardless of the source. In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld
the SEC's authority to craft Rule 14e-3 in United States v. 0 H1agan.
56
Dean Manne would reject the approach to insider trading in the tender
offer context reflected in Rule 14e-3.
A number of legal principles were generated by the decisions
discussed above. After Chiarella, anyone who trades on non-public
information must have a pre-existing duty of a fiduciary nature in or-
der for the trading to constitute a violation of section 10(b). Once the
SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 in the wake of Chiarella, whenever infor-
48 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999) (codifying, in amended form, SEC Rule 14e-3).
56 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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mation traded upon pertains to a tender offer, then no trading is per-
mitted, regardless of whether the trading involves the violation of a
fiduciary duty.57 Finally, after O'Hagan, an insider faces potential
liability for misappropriating confidential information for the purpose
of trading in securities when such trading is in breach of a duty owed
to the source of the information.5
However, in an important footnote, the Court in O'Hagan noted
that:
[T]he textual requirement of deception precludes §
10 (b) liability when a person trading on the basis of
nonpublic information has disclosed his trading
plans to, or obtained authorization from, the princi-
pal--even though such conduct may affect the secu-
rities markets in the same manner as the conduct
reached by the misappropriation theory.... Moreo-
ver, once a disloyal agent discloses his imminent
breach of duty, his principal may seek appropriate
equitable relief under state law. Furthermore, in the
context of a tender offer, the principal who author-
izes an agent's trading on confidential information
may, in the Commission's view, incur liability for an
Exchange Act violation under Rule 14e-3(a). 9
Thus, the Court in O'Hagen not only follows, but extends the impor-
tant conception that insider trading liability is based on concrete con-
ceptions of property rights in information, contract, and fiduciary duty
that the Court first advanced in Chiarella. The Court's dicta, how-
ever, went too far in suggesting that insider trading liablity could be
avoided by disclosure. O'Hagan still would have breached his duty
of confidentiality to his law firm and its clients by disclosing the in-
formation and then trading on it.
Dean Manne's work on insider trading is frequently mischarac-
terized. Despite popular belief, Manne never advocated the complete
and widespread practice of insider trading. Rather, he made clear that
"[a]t no point in my entire book do I express the belief that corpora-
tions should be required to tolerate insider trading."60 Instead, Dean
57 Courts are divided whether "knowing possession" of information is enough to convict
the possessor of the knowledge who later trades, or whether there must be a causal connection
between the possession of the information and the "use' of the information in a trade. See Irwin
H. Warren & Beth J. Jacobwitz, Courts Veigh Causation Requirement in SEC's Insider Trading
Cases, 220 N.Y. .J. 1, 8 (Oct. 21, 1998).
5S See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642.
51 lit at 659 n.9.
60 Law Professors, supra note 21, at 581.
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Manne argued that it should be up to the corporation to decide
whether (and how) they want to allow or prohibit insider trading.
Though he states that he personally would prefer to invest in a com-
pany that allowed insider trading,61 he does not believe that there
should be a blanket allowance or restriction. At most, one can quib-
ble with Dean Manne's empirical assumptions about what companies
would do in a world in which executive compensation contracts could
permit insiders to trade; perhaps footnote 9 of O'Hagan sets the stage
for such an empirical test.
Thus, it is inaccurate, and a bit unfair to Dean Manne to assert,
as was done in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law and The Economist during the summer of 1998 that:
The biggest failure of law-and-economics to influ-
ence policy, according to "Law and economics in
action", concerns insider-trading law. In most
countries, the law restricts trading in a firm's shares
by people who have confidential information about
the firm's prospects. Law and economics teaches
that insider trading causes no important harm and,
by transmitting the inside information to the market,
brings an important benefit: more accurate share
prices. This argument has, however, failed to per-
suade most legislators or market practitioners, who
object to insider trading on the ground that it might
deter outside investors.
In fact, I argue that the movement of the law reflects a move-
ment toward the law and economics way of thinking, and toward no-
tions of efficiency. At the same time, the assertion that law and eco-
nomics teaches that insider trading causes "no important harm," as
well as the assertion that insider trading brings an important benefit in
the form of more accurate share prices by transmitting the inside in-
formation to the market, clearly are derived from Dean Manne's
scholarly contributions.
Professor Manne argues that the SEC should adopt a rule re-
quiring corporations to disclose whether or not they allow their insid-
ers to trade on information in the stock market and under what condi-
tions.63 This disclosure process would facilitate the SEC's govern-
ance of the market and would provide corporations with the opportu-
61 See id.
62 The Law is an Ass: But Don't Worry, Economists Are Trying to Make it Smarter,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1998, at 68.63 See Law Professors, supra note 21, at 581.
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nity to choose which trading method better meets the needs of that
particular firm.
As Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel observe, there is little evi-
dence that corporations have ever put forth measures intended to out-
law insider trading at the corporate level unless such action was taken
in accordance with a governmental regulation. 64 Thus, it appears to
some that corporations would prefer to have the choice and further, it
is possible to conclude that corporations would prefer to allow it.
Such views, however, may not afford sufficient attention to the diffi-
culty in drafting an appropriate ban on insider trading because no-
body-not even the SEC-would categorically ban all trading by of-
ficers, directors, or other insiders. Similarly, Deans Fischel and
Manne and Professor Carlton may not give sufficient respect to the
role historically played by norms, implicit contracts, and fiduciary
principles in limiting the incidence of insider trading.
III. CONCLUSION
Dean Manne was certainly correct when he observed, almost
twenty years after publication of his original work, that even though
his theory doesn't yet represent the majority view in this area, his
work now sets the debate agenda.65 Manne's view, however, has
been extremely influential and has clearly exerted an enormous
gravitational pull on law and policy in this area. In particular, the
original fairness and moral arguments espoused originally in cases
like Texas Gulf Sulphur have been completely rejected. Dean Manne
certainly deserves credit for moving the debate about insider trading
from a discourse based on emotion and empty assertion to a discourse
based on economic analysis and, increasingly, empirical hypotheses
accompanied by testing.
Following up on Dean Manne's early theory that insider trading
law and policy may be a product of politics rather than economics,
others including Judge Richard Posner have argued that regulation
may reflect an effort by the SEC to reallocate wealth through regula-
tion.66 The wealth comes in the form of the information that moti-
vates the trading. When corporate officials who cannot trade are
forced to give this information to market professionals who can trade,
then wealth is transferred from the corporate officials and the corpo-
64 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 20, at 858.
65 See Property Rights, supra note 16, at 933.
66 See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC., Spring
1971, at 22.
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ration who bears higher compensation costs to the market profession-
als.67
Dean Manne's comprehensive analysis presented a plausible
theory that is far richer, more coherent, and more easily tested than its
inchoate rivals. Manne's achievement in writing about insider trading
certainly was as important an advancement in legal theory and law
and economics as the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theory or the
Black-Scholes options pricing model were in finance, for which Al-
fred Nobel Prizes in Economic Science were richly deserved and ul-
timately awarded to Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller, Fischer Black
and Myron Scholes. Sadly for Manne, there is no Nobel Prize in
Law.
67 See Property Rights, supra note 16, at 942.
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